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A  m a t e r i a l i s t i c  a p p r o a c h  t o  c o n s c i o u s -  
n e s s ,  l o n g  i g n o r e d  i n  m a i n s t r e a m  r e -  
s e a r c h  b u t  e m e r g i n g  i n  c r i t i c a l  t h e o r y ,  
m a y  h e l p  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  i d e o l o g i c a l  
i m p a c t  o f  m e d i a  i n  w h i c h  d o m i n a n t  c u l -  
t u r a l  m e a n i n g s  a r e  s u b j e c t i v e l y  i n t e r -  
n a l i z e d .  
Une approche mat6rialistic , longtemps 
nCglig6e par les chercheurs, mais 
pointant parmi les thCoristes, explique 
mieux et plus complktement llinfluence 
id6ologique de m6dia sur les individus. 
The psychology of consciousness, meaning 
the study of the relationships between behavior, 
experience and overall patterns of psychological 
functioning at any given time, is presently 
going through something of a renewal in a wide 
arena of discussion, ranging from chapters in 
col lege textbooks and articles in scholarly 
journals to the practical applications of teach- 
ers, psychiatrists, counsellors and coaches 
(1981 ). Much of this renewal centers on ways to 
develop a full range of states of consciousness 
(including relaxation, visualization, creative 
reveries, hypnosis, biofeedback, electrical 
brain stimulation, dreaming) and to use altered 
states to enquire deeper into the nature of 
human intell igence , to accelerate learning, 
improve memory, speed convalescence and develop 
other latent abilities which are found more 
frequently in ethnic groups outside the pale of 
Western culture. Yet, one of the absences in 
the 1 iterature (for instance, Brain/Mind Bulle- 
tin ; Revision ; Journal of Consciousness and 
Change; Phoenix; Journal of Transpersonal An - 
thropology) is exploration of the interactions 
between consciousness and media, considered 
either in an individual context or in the col- 
lective context of culture, public mind or Zeit- 
geist. 
When one turns to the literature of media 
studies, it must be concluded that consciousness 
is hardly a salient notion there either, in 
considerations of how human beings interact with 
each other through the technologies of communi- 
cation. There are historical reasons for this, 
of course: the same behaviorist paradigm which 
closed the theoretical gap between stimulus and 
response in psychology also dominated American 
media theory since its inception in the 1940s, 
leaving little room between content analysis and 
study of the "effects" of that content in which 
to conceptualize the intervening notion of con- 
sciousness. In the copious 1 iterature on the 
effects of violent television programming on 
viewers' behavior, for instance, the concept of 
consciousness is rarely taken into account, 
though it is obviously implied in such contexts 
as the role of the media in providing fantasies 
which act as "coping or adaptive mechanisms use- 
ful when delays in gratification occur" (Fesh- 
bach and Singer, 1971, 63). It is also implied, 
though not explicitly theorized, in the various 
approaches to what McGee (1980) calls "syrnbo- 
1 ist" theories of meaning, for example in the 
"chaining out" of fantasy themes through a cul- 
ture (Bormann, 1972 and 1982; Cragan and 
Shields, 1981; Mohrmann, 1982), or the consoli- 
dation of myths through media re-presentations 
(Breen and Corcoran , 1981 ) , or the cultivation 
of anxiety and fear in heavy television users 
(Van Poec ke , 1980 ) . 
The striking absence of a theory of con- 
sciousness within media studies can be seen most 
clearly with a few examples. Adolph Hitler, it 
r has been said, objectified Germans ' self -hatred "in the tropological figure of the magically 
corrupting Jew" (Geertz, 1964, 72), thus trans- 
forming a prevalent personal neurosis into a 
\ powerful social force. Winston Churchi 11 too, 
formulated the mood of Britons by transforming 
disconnected, private emotions into a publ ic 
possession in the war against Hitler. More 
recently , Margaret Thatcher has been credited 
with uniting much of English public opinion 
behind the war against argentina by reviving the 
grandi loquent discourse of Churchi 11 (Hal 1 , 
1982). Each of these transformations of publ ic 
consciousness was achieved through the dissemin- 
ation of mediated messages. Thus, through the 
construction of symbolic models of social order 
wemake ourselves political animals. The ques- 
tion remains, however, why people become moti- 
vated by public meanings, especially when these 
are in opposition to their traditional notions 
of "decency" or are in conflict with their own 
social interests. Reflections on this question 
have been spurred by the continuing feminist 
interest in how sexual ideclogies play a role in 
the construction of individual identity, how, 
for example, the mystique of feminine fulfill- 
ment, which was so powerful at one time that 
"women grew up no longer knowing that they have 
the desires and capabilities the mystigue for- 
bids" (Friedan, 1963, 56) achieved its effect at 
the level of individual consciousness. Tradi- 
tional media theory has been slow to explain how 
the conditioning of consciousness takes place, 
slow to develop a political psychology which 
would supplement the long-standing interest in 
the behavioral "effects" of the media. While 
behaviorist research simply ignored the fact 
that human activity is a blend of conscious and 
unconscious elements (percept ions , self -images , 
fantasies, character structure, etc .) symbolist 
approaches contained untheor i zed assumptions 
concerning the connect ions between mediated 
social definitions of reality and changes in 
human consciousness. 
The purpose of this essay is to investigate 
the notion of consciousness as a communication 
variable which has generally remained imp1 icit 
or untheorized within the mainstream of media 
studies, particularly in the United States. The 
relationship between consciousness and media 
will be explored as part of the problem of how 
pub1 ic meanings, mediated through the technolo- 
gies of mass communication, enter into the 
format ion of individual consciousness through 
being subjectively internalized by participants 
in a particular culture. It will be suggested 
that consciousness is now being foregrounded for 
inspection, albeit hesitantly, within European 
critical media theory in its various attempts to 
construct a theory of ideology using the frame- 
work of psychoanalysis. These attempts will be 
explored with a view to demarcating a site where 
future productive debate may take place between 
the widely divergent traditions of American and 
European communication theory which are s t  i 11 
substantial ly insulated from one another (Carey, 
1979). I t  is hoped that t h i s  essay will a t  
least make a thrust towards the development of a 
theory of media and consciousness, indicating 
how i t s  general features may be mapped out even 
if i t s  specificity remains to be developed. 
CRITICAL MEDIA THEORY 
There are a t  least three senses in which 
the term ideology has been employed. I t  has 
been used to  designate a coherent set of ideas 
or beliefs by which people "posit, explain or justify ends and means of organized social ac- 
tion, and specifically political action, irre- 
spective of whether such action aims to  pre- 
serve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given order" 
(Seliger, 1976, 14).  Examples of th is  form are 
usages such as "Soc ia 1 i st IdeologyM or "Tory 
Ideology" or the recent cal l  by Von Kuehnelt- 
Ceddihn (1983) for an explicit ideology to f i l l  
in the "pictures" in the "frame" of the newly- 
ascendent Right in America. Secondly, the term 
i s  used in a derogatory sense, derived from 
Napoleon's differences with the educational 
reformers of the French rev0 luti on ( Larrain , 
1979, 28) to signify visionary moonshine, or 
extremist and unrealistic political policies. 
In  i t s  third meaning, ideology is used in an 
epistemological sense t o  refer t o  the process by 
which we know the world, t h a t  i s ,  to the rela- 
tionship between "reality" and the various forms 
of consciousness to which i t  gives rise. This 
is  the sense t h a t  will be pursued here. 
Although a concern for demystifying ideolo- 
gical consciousness dominates much of modern 
European media theory, the concern can be traced 
in Western philosophy as far back as Plato's 
cri tici sms of the apparent obviousness of doxa 
or common-sense discourses (Plato , 1 9 m  
through Machiavelli Is (Crick, 1970) attacks on 
the uses of religion to teach mass passivity in 
the face of the tyranny of Princes, to Feuer- 
bach's (Barth, 1976) critique of divinity as a 
creation of alienated human beings. Critical 
theory builds on the attempts of Marx and Engels 
in the nineteenth century to discern another 
form of distorted consciousness, that derived 
from the social and economic conditions of exis- 
tence, as the forms of thought and feeling of 
one particular group within a culture gain ad- 
herence among almost all other groups. Ideology 
in this sense is embedded in general perceptions 
and explanations of the world which disguise the 
roots they have in the perspective of one domi- 
nant group, whose interests are thus defended 
and legitimatized (Marx and Engels, 1962, 222- 
223). The concept of culture implied here re- 
presents a sharp attack on traditional notions 
of cultural (and individual ) autonomy. Related, 
though distinctly different alternatives to 
cultural autonomy can be found in Whorf 's (1956) 
idea that language fashions culture and in In- 
nis' (1950, 1951 ) and McLuhants (1966) assertion 
that technology shapes culture. 
The notion of consciousness has been kept 
alive in the materialist tradition of accounting 
for pub1 ic meanings and political behavior, 
where "the essential question posed by the fact 
of society is one of locating precise descrip- 
tions of the dialectical tension between a 
'true' and a 'false' consciousness, between 
reality and ideology" (McGee, 1980, 2). The 
call to make the world aware of its own con- 
sciousness, "to awaken it out of its own dream 
about itself" (Marx and Engels, 1975, 144) was 
made by Marx, while Engels, half a century 
later, -coined the familiar phrase "false con- 
sciou~ness~~ to refer to the successful interna- 
lization of class-based i llusions and mystif ica- 
tions by subjects who thus lose touch with the 
real motives impelling them. Falseconscious- 
ness is thus a distorting veil that hangs over 
the eyes of people, preventing them from seeing 
the world for what it really is. 
From scattered references in the writings 
of Marx and Engels, then, a notion of ideology 
emerges which informs contemporary theories of 
media influence. In so far as ideology presents 
an illusion as reality, it has an empirical 
basis in the experience of a specific social 
group and is normative for the rest of society, 
turning what is a fact for one group in an 
"ought" or ideal for all. Since it is built on 
a narrow social point of view, it is encased 
within a specific body of unexamined assumptions 
through which its view of the world is filtered. 
Universal, eternal, absolute validity is claimed 
for this partial social point of view, which 
misperceives and distorts and mystifies as it is 
universalized. Thus, ideology legitimatizes an 
exi sting power structure and becomes indispensa- 
ble for its reproduction in a non-coercive way. 
The interests of one group are represented as 
the common interests of all, as the only ration- 
al, universally valid interests. Actual con- 
flicts of interest are hidden in ideology which, 
as Poulantzas (1971 , 207) suggests, "reconsti- 
tutes on an imaginary level a relatively coher- 
ent discourse which serves as the horizon of 
agents experience ." Remote, and theref ore 
fairly obvious examples of "negative" classes 
which internalized ideological be1 iefs that 
originated elsewhere and myst if ied their exploi- 
tation, can be found in medieval serfs who ac- 
cepted their misery as part of a God-given hier- 
archical order, or in those Blacks in Southern 
States who believed in their owners' rights to 
keep them in slavery. 
It is probably the work of Antonio Gramsci 
in the 19301s, more than any other theorist of 
culture, that has opened up a theoretical space 
in which to study mass communication as a social 
force more complex in its operation that "vulgar 
Marxist" (Rader , 1979, xx) theories of manipula- 
tion by a dominant class would imply. This 
shift is emphasized in Gramsci's analysis of 
mass psychology (in his case, Fascism) through 
the concept of cultural hegenomy , one of the key 
concepts in his mature writings. The supremacy 
of a social group can be achieved in two differ- 
ent ways, he argues, through coercion or con- 
sent. Besides influencing behavior externally 
through the rewards and punishments of the re- 
pressive apparatuses of the state (the police, 
courts, military, prison system, etc.), social 
control can also be exercised internally , "by 
molding personal convictions into a replica of 
prevailing norms" (Femia, 1981, 24). This 
consensual aspect of political control is hege- 
mony, objectified in and achieved through civil 
society, that is, those institutions which cre- 
ate and diffuse cognitive and affective struc- 
ture through which we perceive and interpret 
social reality: fami ly , school, church, politi- 
cal parties, trade unions and, of course, mass 
media. Thus one concept of reality, one way of 
life and thought, absorbing and pacifying the 
outlooks of subordinate groups, is diffused 
throughout society (Gramsci , 1971 ) . Hegemony 
becomes what Raymond Williams (1977, 110) calls 
a "saturation of the whole process of living--to 
such a depth that the pressures and limits of 
what can ultimately be seen as a specific eco- 
nomic, political and cultural system seem to 
most of us the pressures and limits of simple 
experience and common sense. " 
Gramsci's writings on hegemony have laid 
the foundation for much of European critical 
media theory (Hall, et al., 1980; Williams, 
1977) by stressing that the suppression of al- 
ternative meanings, once carried out exclusively 
through the coercive apparatuses of the state, 
is now achieved in part by the mass media in 
their ability to define the parameters of what 
is "legitimate , sane, reasonable, practical , 
good, true and beautiful" (Sallach, 1974, 166). 
With the successful naturalization and universa- 
lization of the world view of a particular so- 
cial group, critics can then be presented as 
naive, irresponsible, Utopian or even "ideologi- 
cal " ( in the derogatory Napoleonic sense), since 
one of the most striking aspects of ideology is 
that it is "critical towards its adversary but.. 
uncritical towards itself" (Marx and Engels , 
1975, 181). The role of media in bringing about 
a hegemonic social consensus needs no conspiracy 
theory to support it since these hegemonic ma- 
neuvers are learned through the experience of 
becoming a "professional" in a media organiza- 
tion (Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 1978). 
The key concept here is the power of the 
media to define , not merely reproduce real ity , 
through their narrative devices which actively 
make things mean. Reality is no longer viewed 
as a given set of facts, to be reflected in 
televised news or fiction. Instead, it is the 
result of a particular way of constructing, 
through preferred meanings, a "reality" which 
would have credibility, legitimacy and a taken- 
for-grantedness. Alternative realities, occa- 
sional ly seeping into the pub1 ic consciousness 
through alternative media, would, of course, be 
marginal ized , down-graded and delegit imized . 
Examples of ideological deconstruction in Bri - 
tian within the last decade can be found in Hall 
et al., (1980), Millum (1975), Halloran et al., 
( 1970 ) , Gurevitch et a1 . , ( 1982 ) , Connell 
(IWg), Curran et al., (1979), Garnham (l979), 
Hartman (1979), Morley (1980) Golding and El- 
liott (1979), and Golding and Murdock (1979). 
On-going concerns can be traced in the journals 
Screen and Screen Education (now amalgamated ) 
and in Media, Culture and Society. 
Though much of the seminal work on ideology 
as an epistemological problem has been accomp- 
lished in Europe, there are clear signs of an 
American rapprochement with critical media the- 
ory, particularly in the investigation of news. 
News, it is argued, is constructed by manageable 
deviations from a system of "order" which oper- 
ates below the surface of the daily minor devia- 
tions which "make news" in the areas of violen- 
ce, inequality , racism, sexism, etc . (Tuchman , 
1978). One of the mechanisms of this reproduc- 
tion of an ideological "order" is the reliance 
of the institutions of journalism on bureaucra- 
tic sources of data, a reliance in which the 
pertinence and veracity of those data are as- 
sumed (Altheide, 1976; Fishman, 1978 and 1980; 
Gans, 1979; Molotch and Lester, 1974). 
The influence of Gramsci i s  clearly seen in 
Gitlinls (1980) s tudy of the media's response t o  
the various movements t o  end the Vietnam War, 
particularly the processes whereby mass commun i- 
cat ion produced a hegemonic common -sense which 
helped t o  forge and maintain political consen- 
sus. Nor has television drama escaped the charge 
t h a t  there are connections between i t s  fictional 
portrayals and the maintenance of a dominant 
social order. Philip Wander (1979),  for ex- 
ample, has explored what the soap operas omit 
form their worldview: 
The soaps rarely lead us into the more 
baffling social problems, the sort 
which cannot be corrected by a few 
hours' surgery, a visit t o  a psychia- 
t r i s t  or a lawyer, or a brilliant mar- 
riage. The poor are blacked o u t ,  the 
rich appear in soft lights. We see 
their personal problems b u t  not the 
methods by which they maintain their 
position i n  society. Doctors are weal- 
thy; health-care costs are not discus- 
sed; there is no unnecessary surgery. 
. . . .Most soap opera survival strategies 
belong almost exclusively t o  the mem- 
bers of the upper class.. ..There are no 
diseases resulting from smog or bad 
working conditions, a sudden increase 
in work loads, unemployment or the 
insane pace of social change (p .  87). 
Gandy ( 1982) has examined connections between 
television dramas, the cultivation of health 
anxiety and the reinforcement of the dominant 
U.S. medical ideology. 
Like other manipulatory theories of media, 
ideological theory has an impoverished concep- 
tualization of the construction of individual 
consciousness within the total ideological pro- 
cess. The psychological issue of how ideologies 
are subjectively internalised is far from fully 
resolved inmodern critical theory. How does 
ideology enter into the formation of individual 
conscicusness among participants in a particular 
culture? Much critical media theory in the past 
has concentrated on what Fredric Jameson (1981 , 
287) calls a "negati ve hermeneutic" function, 
that is, demystifying the instrumental aspects 
of cultural texts in the reproduction of a par- 
ticular social formation. He calls for the 
simultaneous exercise of a "positive hermeneu- 
tic ," that is, an exploration of the mythic 
impulses released and managed by those same mass 
cultural texts within "a complex strategy of 
rhetorical persuasion in which substantial in- 
centives are offered for ideological adherence. " 
The implication is that ideology involves a 
process of "compensatory exchange" in which the 
media consumer is offered spec if ic grat if ica- 
tions in return for consent to passive acceptan- 
ce of a dominating world-view. 
What is the nature of this exchange? Jame- 
son speculates that if it is a process whereby 
"otherwise dangerous and protopol it ical impu 1 - 
ses" are "managed and defused, rechanneled and 
offered spurious objects," then it must be asked 
how "these same impulses--the raw material on 
which the process works--are initial ly awakened 
within the very text that seeks to sti 11 them" 
(p. 287). The outline of an answer to this 
question can be discerned within the theoretical 
framework of Freudian psychoanalysis, particu- 
larly as it has evolved in two different direc- 
tions: the exploration of censoring mechanisms 
by Wi lhelm Reich , and of the origins of language 
by Louis Althusser. 
CONSCIOUSNESS AND CHARACTER STRUCTURE 
Although the term ideology was not used by 
Freud, a psychological conception of ideology 
emerges from his suggestion that most human acts 
respond to basic impulses and instincts which 
the human mind tries to conceal by constructing 
s rational account of irrational behaviour. The 
xychological mechanism of transposition or 
projection, for example, which, Freud claimed, 
is very commonly employed in normal life as well 
as in paranoid states of mind (1958, 209), con- 
sists of an internal impulse which is concealed 
or distorted by its transposition within con- 
sciousness into the form of an external percep- 
tion. Similarly, the mechanism of rationaliza- 
tion consists in the neurotic concealing of 
inner desires by putting forward the appearance 
~f rationality for instinctive impulses which 
would not normally be socially tolerated (Freud 
1958, 192). In both cases, an internal contra- 
diction, in the form of a psychological conflict 
letween impulses, prompts an attempt to find a 
logical, though distorted, solution by being 
transposed into the external world. 
These mechanisms match, in an inverted way, 
the mechanisms of ideology by which an external 
~ontradiction receives a distorted solution in 
the mind. Freud came close to a psychological 
theory of ideology near the end of his career in 
iis analysis of the defense mechanism called 
"identification" and in his analysis of reli- 
jion. Achild, for instance, when overwhelmed 
~y fear of an aggressor, may attempt to overcome 
the unbearable anguish by identifying with the 
personality of the aggressor. Freud saw this 
mechanism as one of the factors which could 
explain the attachment of oppressed people to 
the cultural ideals of their oppressors (Freud, 
1928). In his analysis of religion, Freud fol- 
lowed Feuerbach in contending that human beings 
have always needed protection against the uncer- 
tainties of life and thus create gods with the 
traits of father figure. Religion is an illu- 
sion, "the universal obsessional neurosis of 
humanity" (Freud, 1928, 76) which crystallizes 
in gods those human wishes that derive from our 
helplessness. 
The early work of Wilhelm Reich represents 
one of the first attempts to theorize the social 
determinants of human consciousness. Reich took 
the individual mechanisms of Freud a stage fur- 
ther by suggesting that they can have a collec- 
tive impact in the form of an ideology. His 
analysis of German National Socialism, for ex- 
ample, suggests that extreme nationalism and 
racism politically activated a frustrated popu- 
lation at a time when a rigid patriarchy and an 
extreme repression of sexual impulses was mold- 
ing character structure in a particular way. 
Thus, he expanded traditional materialist analy- 
sis by emphasizing that the structure of society 
alone is not sufficient to explain ideology. In 
his view, political psychology should try "to 
determine as completely as possible, the myriad 
internediary links in the transforming of the 
material base into the ideological superstruc- 
ture" (1976, X X V I I I ) .  His own work represents a 
systematic attempt to incorporate influences 
into psychoanalytic theory and to reveal the 
psychological processes which influence the 
social conditioning of consciousness. 
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Reich's conclusion was t h a t  the social 
structure is psychologically reproduced within 
the individual as a corresponding character 
structure and t h a t  this takes place primarily 
within the setting of the family, which provides 
the crucial mediation between ideology and the 
development of character. In  addressing the 
question of why large nmbers of people were 
mobilized by Fascism, Reich believed t h a t  the 
movement appealed t o  the authoritarian character 
structure of the German middle-class family, 
which could share, via identification, in the 
greatness of the Fuhrer and the na t ion  (Reich , 
1970, 75 - 79). Working-class families, not 
being as isolated from one another in working 
and living conditions, cultivated less rigid 
character structures, better able to resist the 
authority of exploiters, with the result t h a t  
the largest core of followers of Fascism were 
rural, business and white-collar middle classes 
(Reich, 1970, 13).  
In Reich's view, then, ideology is embedded 
in character structure, the basic t ra i t s  of 
which are formed in early childhood during the 
development of the superego. The patriarchal 
family i s  not  on ly  an economic u n i t  b u t  a trans- 
mitter of ideologies and an agent in  the devel- 
opment of a submissive character structure. The 
ideological function of the family is experi- 
enced by i t s  members as feelings of family d u t y  
-- the wage-earner accepts u n j  ust conditions of 
employment imposed by the employer and represses 
anger provoked by exploitation, wh i le women 
continue t o  serve as domestic servants in the 
family in response to feelings of family d u t y .  
These feelings of d u t y  breed conservatism and 
the repression of social criticism by blocking 
the articulation of anger and frustration fe l t  
in the workplace, a1 1 in the interest of family 
responsibility. Ideologically reconciled to the 
existing social order, parents communicate their 
acceptance of soci a1 authority to their chi 1 - 
dren . 
In Reichi an psychoanalysis , character struc- 
ture is reinforced within the family through its 
lifelong repression of sexuality and the associ- 
ation of unconscious feelings of gui It with 
sexual desires. The same psychological disposi- 
tion is the basis of mass acceptance of author- 
ity: by assimilating the external authority of 
sexual moral ism, the individual is predisposed 
to internalize and submit to authority in social 
life (Reich, 1970, 30 - 31 ). In this way, the 
transmission of moral istic sexual attitudes 
within the family assumes political consequen- 
ces, because the family "produces the authority- 
fearing, 1 ife-fearing vassal and thus constantly 
creates new possibilities whereby a handful of 
men in power can rule the masses" (Reich, 1975, 
95). 
Reich adds a psycholagical dimension to the 
theory of ideology by explaining how ideologies 
are reproduced within individuals through uncon- 
sc ious association with repressed impu 1 ses . The 
process is dialectical : the social conditions 
forcing people to repress basic needs and emo- 
t ions produce a characterological submissiveness 
which readily accepts the relationships of au- 
thority that are taken for granted in dominant 
ideology (Cohen, 1982, 157). Thus Reich offers 
refinement to the traditional Marxist explana- 
tion of human nature as an embodiement of the 
history and structure of the social relation- 
ships within which it finds itself. It has been 
suggested that his analysis of the political 
function of sexual repression may s t i l l  be time- 
ly, as the strength of the moralistic "New 
Right" in the United States indicates (Cohen, 
1982, 201 ). His work in the Sex-Pol movement in 
Germany suggests ways in which other institu- 
tions besides family --religion, schools, tele- 
vision, for example -- must be examined to  see 
if they also foster feelings of dependency 
through identification with symbols of author- 
ity. George Gerbner (Van Poecke, 1980) has 
already begun the systematic investigation of 
how televised violence cultivates learned help- 
lessness and acquiescence to  power. 
CONSCIOUSNESS AND LANGUAGE 
While Reich' s pol itical psychology found i t s  
roots in Freud' s theory of censoring mechanisms, 
contemporary French analyses of the psychology 
of ideology find their roots in Freud's approach 
to  language. His theoretical model of the u n -  
conscious suggests t h a t  it is the si te of mean- 
ingful representations of experiences which can 
be consciously apprehended through 1 anguage . 
Freud's method of analyzing the latent content 
of dreams, for instance, is characterized by 
unravelling the primary processes which govern 
the links between the latent, repressed content 
and the manifest content which the dreamer can 
remember (Freud, 1958, 277). 
Setting out to reinterpret Freud in the 
1 ight of Sausseurian 1 ingu i s t  ic theory, Jacques 
Lacan (1977) emphasizes the mechanisms of con- 
densation and displacement as the very mechan- 
isms of language itself through which the social 
construction of the individual subject takes 
place. Through condensat ion, one idea comes to  
represent a number of chains of meaning in the 
unconscious. Through displacement, an original- 
ly important idea is invested with psychic ener- 
gy which is actually rooted in another idea. 
Lacan links condensation to metaphoric relations 
in language whereby a conscious idea is 1 inked 
to a number of unconscious chains of meaning. 
And he 1 inks displacement with metonymy, the 
linguistic ability to represent an idea by re- 
ference to only part of it. Much of this lin- 
guistic ability is initiated in a child's "mir- 
ror" phase of development, when the child, at 
about the age of six months, experiences itself 
as a fragmented mass of uncoordinated 1 imbs and 
learns to identify with ("mis-recognize") a mir- 
ror image of a complete, unified body. 
Much of Lacan's psychoanalytic model has 
been transported into the region of ideology, 
where the structure of mis-recognition has been 
taken up by Althusser (1965 and 1971 ) ,  Laclau 
(1977) and others as one of the mechanisms at 
work in the epistemological processes of ideolo- 
gy. The unformed infant becomes a subject 
through entering into language, a network of 
signif iers organized around certain culturally 
privileged signifiers which act as nodal points 
structuring the network in a definite way. Ide- 
ology is said to operate in a similar manner, 
through the workings of the twin mechanisms of 
misrecognition and interpellation. Althusser 
poses the question how are individuals in socie- 
ty formed as subjects who "live" various kinds 
of oppression, in the sense of accepting them as 
"necessary" (Althusser, 1971, 123 - 173). He 
answers by drawing on Lacan's (1977) concept of 
the "mirror." Just as the infant is confronted 
by the prefabricated "self" it will become in 
its "mirror" phase, so an ideological subject 
becomes a subject by recognizing an image of the 
"other" as i t s  own image. The function of ide- 
ology in adapting individuals t o  the demands 
society makes on t h e m  is achieved by constitut- 
ing individuals as subjects in the world--and 
n o t  allowing t h e m  t o  see themselves as the ob- 
ject or effect of the world. They live within a 
social format ion as if they were freely control - 
1 ing their conditEnSof existence. This takes 
place through the crucial a c t  of individuals 
"recognizing" the illusion t h a t  the world and 
history were created for them, with the assur- 
ance t h a t  if they conform with what is required 
of them bysociety, a l l  will be well. Thus, 
Althusser retains the materialist notion of 
individuals being constituted as subjects by a 
pre-existing system of relations, b u t  borrows 
the psychoanalytic notion of the "mirror" t o  
explain how the roles of subjectlobject are 
reversed in peoples' imaginations as they live 
within ideology. 
The second mechanism in Althusser ' s expl an- 
ation of ideology is "interpel lation." Ideology 
transforms individuals into subjects by "that 
very precise operation which I have called in- 
terpellation or hailing and which can be ima- 
gined along the lines of the most commonplace 
everyday police (orother)  hailing: 'Hey, you 
there1" (Althusser, 1971, 163). When indivi- 
duals are interpellated as subjects, the ambi- 
guity of the term "subject" emerges: "(1) a 
free subjectivity, a center of initiatives , 
author of and responsible for i t s  actions; ( 2 )  a 
subjected being, who submits t o  a higher author- 
ity and is therefore stripped of all freedom 
except t h a t  of freely accepting submission" 
(1977, 169). Laclau (1977, 102 - 104), suggests 
t h a t  different types of interpel lations (pol i t i  - 
cal , aesthetic, religious, fami 1 ial , etc .) may 
coexist while being articulated within an uni- 
fied ideological discourse. In periods of so- 
cial stability, contradictions can be neutra- 
lized and absorbed by the dominant ideological 
discourse, as, for instance, between re1 igious 
interpellations of an ascetic kind and an in- 
creasing enjoyment of worldly goods, without 
subjects "living" these as incompatible. In 
periods of crisis, however, when ideological 
contradictions in all their sharpness become 
translated into an "identity crisis ," one sector 
may try to recoflstitute a new ideological unity 
through a narrative version which denies all 
interpellations but one and transforms this into 
a critique of the existing system and a recon- 
struction of the entire ideological domain. The 
religious interpellation for instance, may come 
to be a chief reorganizer of all familial, poli- 
tical , aesthetic and economic aspects of cul- 
ture. An example of this can be seen in the 
rise of the fundamentalist Islamic sect of Wah- 
habism in 18th century Arabia, on which the 
power of the modem House of Saud is built 
(Lacey , 1981 ) . Contemporary examples can be 
found in the rise of the Religious New Right in 
America or Khomeinism in Iran. 
The ambiguity of the term "subject" per- 
meates the work of Michel Foucault also, espe- 
cially his attempts to theorize the constitution 
of the subject within a historical framework, 
that is, as the result of the historical produc- 
tion of discursive formations (for example, the 
Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Age of Reason, 
the Modern Age, Post-Modernity etc .) , shaped by 
particular sets of social conditions which con- 
stitute subjectivity in particular ways. The 
subject is that which denotes as well as that 
which is denoted. I t  can b o t h  construct dis- 
course and be constructed by i t .  Subjectivity 
is  both the embodiment of thought, which sus- 
tains sense, and t h a t  which is brought under the 
influence of something t h a t  has the capacity to 
"subject ." Foucault sees no contradiction in 
the notion t h a t  the subject i s  the support on 
which discourse is built, while a t  the same time 
being an object produced by the discourse which 
dominates i t .  "All these contents t h a t  [man's] 
knowledge reveals to  him as exterior t o  himself 
and older t h a n  his own birth, anticipate him, 
overhang him with a l l  their solidity and traver- 
se him as though  he were merely an object of 
nature, a face doomed t o  be erased in the course 
of history" (Foucault, 1970, 313). 
Our humanity is  therefore not the image we 
construe of ourselves , through conscience or 
self -knowledge, b u t  something over which we have 
l i t t l e  control, since i t  is shaped by material, 
historical forces. Thus, Foucault would analyze 
a discursive formation such as the Reformation 
as "a great cr is is  of the Western experience of 
subjectivity and a revolt against the religious 
and moral power which gave form, during the 
Middle Ages, to this subjectivity" (1983, 213). 
Viewed in this way, the Reformation was a strug- 
gle for a new subjectivity. The subject in 
today's world i s ,  of course, also placed in 
power relations which are very complex. The 
modern state has integrated and reshaped an old 
power technique which originated in Christian 
institutions, w h a t  Foucault calls "pastoral 
power ." Spread and multipl ied now far beyond 
ecclesiastical settings, this i s  the power of 
the state to individualize people i n  particular 
ways. Thus, Foucault's call t o  emancipation 
focuses on subjectivity: "We have t o  promote 
new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of 
this kind of individuality which has been im- 
posed on us for several centuries" (1983, 216). 
Yet another decisive break with idealist 
conceptions of consciousness is found in the 
work of the journal Tel Quel in France and of 
Coward and Ell is ( 1977) in England, seeking to  
explore s t i l l  further the juncture of Psycho- 
analysis and Marxism. Common t o  both approaches 
i s  the complete undermining of the notion of an 
unified and consistent subject. I t  is the work- 
ing of ideology which produces the imaginary 
sense of continuity and coherence in the sub- ject, while the subject in fact is traversed 
with contradict ions which leave i t  decentered 
rather t h a n  homogeneous: 
The consistent subject is the place t o  
which the representat ions of ideology 
are directed: Duty, Morality and Law 
all  depend on th is  category of subject 
for their functioning, and a l l  contri- 
bute as institutions to  i t s  production. 
The individual thus lives his subject- 
ion t o  social structures as a consis- 
tent subject-ivity, an imaginary whole- 
ness. Ideologies set in place the 
individual as though he were this sub- ject: the individual produces himself 
in this imaginary wholeness, this ima- 
ginary reflection of himself as the 
author of his act ions (Coward and E l -  
l i s ,  1977, 76) .  
Thus, the not ion of ideology i s expanded t o  
include the processes whereby suitable subjects 
for certain meanings are constructed. Such 
subjects think and feel themselves t o  be the 
free origin of their ideas and actions, even 
when there is evidence t o  the contrary. Once 
again, psychoanalysis is  credited w i t h  the uni- 
que power t o  analyze the disunity of conscious- 
ness, i n  particular how the individual is  so- 
cially formed as a specific subjectivity, how i t  
is  shaped t o  be the s i te  where a specific mean- 
ing can be realized even as the subject feels i t  
is  itself the coherent source of the meaning. 
Ideology is therefore both a practice of repre- 
sentation and the construction of a subject for 
t h a t  representation. I t  is "the practice in 
which individuals are produced and produce their 
orientations to the social structures so t h a t  
they can act within those structures in various 
ways" (Coward and Ellis, 1977, 72) .  
Common t o  much recent work which revisits 
psychoanalysis with a view t o  discovering the 
roots of power in modern societies, is a t o t a l  
rejection of idealist notions of a pure, unified 
consciousness which transcends the social system 
and is not constructed in i t .  In i t s  place is  
posited the materialist notion t h a t  conscious- 
ness is constructed by the symbol (language, 
discourse) rather t h a n  being the p o i n t  of origin 
of the symbol. As Coward and Ellis maintain, 
"the individual, even prior t o  his or her birth, 
is always already subject-ed to the structure 
into which he or she is  born. The structure i s  
w h a t  sets in place an experience for the subject 
which i t  includes.. . . [The subject] is  decen- 
tered within this structure, constructed in a 
specific system of differences and their ar- 
rangements" ( 1977, 3 - 4 ) .  Because a l l  power 
relations t h a t  make up a social formation take 
place in language, language since the time of 
Lacan has become the place in which to  study the 
social construction of the individual. What 
remains to  be done now is t o  broaden the concept 
of discourse as a material force acting on con- 
sciousness so t h a t  i t  includes the imagery gene- 
rated every day by the screen media. 
CONCLUSIONS 
I n  the on-going study of how the technology 
of communication structures change, there i s  a 
ground-swell of reaction away from the dominant 
American behaviorist research paradigm among 
European theorists. Underlying this paradigm- 
shift is a replacement of a transportation view 
of communication (focused on the extension of 
messages through space from sender t o  receiver, 
for purposes of attitude or behavior change ) 
with what  Carey (1975) calls a "ri tualist ic" 
view centered on the processes through which a 
shared culture is  maintained in time through the 
celebration of shared be1 iefs. One imp1 ication 
of this move away from behaviorist psychology 
and closer t o  cultural anthropology is t h a t  the 
conventional research assumption t h a t  change is 
the strongest "effect" of mediated communication 
needs to be re-evaluated. Among United States 
scholars, Gerbner has already begun this re- 
evaluation: "Stability (or even resistance t o  
change) may be the significant outcome. We 
can't look for change as the most significant 
accomplishment of the chief arm of established 
culture if i t s  main social function is to  main- 
tain, reinforce and exploit rather t h a n  under- 
mine or subvert prevalent concept ions, be1 ief s 
and behaviors" (Gerbner and Gross, 1980, 156). 
Yet change does take place within the pub- 
lic meaning systems which are the core of any 
culture. The most sal ient of recent changes in 
United States culture is probably the ascendancy 
t 
of the New Right in national politics. Media 
scholars are challenged to understand the role 
of mass communication in this  massive shift in 
political priorities, to examine, for instance, 
Gandy's (1982) assertion t h a t  there was no "con- 
servative mandate" in 1980 in any objective 
sense, as witnessed by CBS and New York Times 
polls. Gandy maintains t h a t  the notion of a 
~ 
growing conservative national mood entered the 
consciousness of 1 i beral pub1 icat ions through 
I the 1970's and with Reagan's election, snowbal- 
led through all the media as journalists increa- 
singly sought o u t  conservatives as knowledgeable 
I sources about the new pol itical trend. The end 
I result of this process was the change effected 
in the consciousness of the Democratic Party, 
which then fel l  in line with many Republican 
I proposals in the belief t h a t  the conservative 
President had the whole nation on his side. A 
similar media phenomenon can perhaps be seen in 
Britian as political opposition t o  Margaret 
Thatcher wilted in the face of w h a t  seemed like 
a national mandate for going t o  war with Argen- 
tina over the Falkland Islands ( H a l l ,  1982). 
The problem remains, how does mass communi- 
cation structure change (or stabi 1 i ty)? The 
question is a l l  the more relevant in the context 
of the rapid emergence of new forms of technolo- 
gy. I t  has been suggested, for example, t h a t  
video games, by act i ve ly engaging participants 
in violent acts such as firing guns, launching 
missiles or driving tanks, 
embed their assumptions concerning our 
culture -- the implicit evilness of the 
enemy, the need to destroy our foes 
completely without attempting di.plomacy 
or other alternate conflict resolution 
procedures , the xenophobia concerning 
representatives of a1 ien cultures, the 
need to destroy an anonymous entity 
through technological ly-mediated paths 
without having to take personal respon- 
sibility or even know the reasons for 
one's own actions -- ever more deeply 
into our consciousness (Toles, in 
press ) . 
It has been suggested in this article that 
the progress towards f u 1 1 er understanding of the 
mass medialaudience interaction has been retar- 
ded by scholarly blindness to the notion of 
consciousness. Conventional psychology, even 
when it does take individual consciousness as 
the focus of its attention, does so by abstrac- 
ting from the total environment of meanings, the 
mass consciousness, within which individual 
consciousness is shaped. European critical 
media theory has kept mass consciousness in 
focus, not simply as a shibboleth for an acade- 
mic discipline but as its direct object of stu- 
dy, by examining how cultural change or stabili- 
ty takes place "in ideology", that is, by being 
"naturalized" and "universalized" through the 
mass media, especially the screen media because 
of their iconic characteristics. Newer develop- 
ments have deviated from traditional critical 
media theory (for example, the Frankfurt school 
of social criticism) by recognizing that ideolo- 
gy has its own conditions of existence that 
cannot simply be inferred from the economic 
position of the individual. These developments 
have moved towards a re-examination of what 
insights psychoanalysis, rather than behavior- 
ism, can offer. Even if theseefforts arefi- 
nally to be rejected as untenable, they have at 
least opened up a theoretical space in which a 
c ruc ia l  set of problems concerning t h e  e f f e c t s  
of mediated communication on consciousness, both 
individual  and s o c i a l ,  can be debated. 
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